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ABSTRACT
Financial globalization has greatly improved the efficiency of capital
transfers around the world, with the cost of facilitating criminal money
laundering activities. Based on case studies on conditions for money
laundering in the process of globalization and transformation in Europe,
are discussed the challenges that a “global financial village” must confront.
Keywords: capital mobility, fight against capital/money laundering;
payment systems, cooperation for financial stability.
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RESUMEN
La globalización financiera ha incrementado substancialmente la eficiencia
en la transferencia de capitales alrededor del mundo, pero con el costo de
facilitar las actividades criminales de lavado de dinero. En base al estudio
de casos sobre las condiciones de lavado de dinero en el proceso de
globalización y transformación en Europa, se discuten los desafíos que
debe confrontar una “aldea financiera global”.
Palabras clave: movilidad de capitales, lucha contra lavado de capital y
dinero, sistemas de pagos, cooperación para la estabilidad financiera.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) process calls for the
continuous improvement of payment services, by offering products that
are as easy, efficient and safe as they are today at the national level. But in
the context of further globalization and European enlargement we see new
risks of money laundering coming1. Money laundering exists on the
Cayman and the Canal islands, but also in Frankfurt. Also it is present in
art auctions in London and in real estates in Miami. Money laundering at
German banks switches or is comfortably at the domestic computer.
Globalization and money laundering have considerably increased with
innovative financial instruments (derivates, etc.) mobilizing enormous
financial resources: e.g. hedge funds established in offshore centers are
estimated to be around US$ 50-100 billions (United Nations, 2007). As the
global financial architecture becomes more complex, the possibilities of indivi-
duals to disrupt markets and distort the value of securities also increases.2
Activities that generate “dirty money” exploit every possibility
offered for laundering capital in financial centers: Cayman Islands, Hong
Kong and Liechtenstein. Money laundering allows crime to pay by
permitting criminals to hide and legitimize proceeds derived from illegal
activities. According to one recent estimate, worldwide money laundering
activity amounts to roughly US$ 1 trillion a year. 
To provide a historical perspective, al Capone’s criminal activities as
a gangster boss in Chicago cleaned illegal dollars in “Laundromats/salons”:
the association with “Money Laundering” is remarkable: based on bookkeeper
Meyer Lansky using a Swiss Bank, criminal money was paid in via
checks, currencies, etc. on a number account. Today informants prefer to
announce their knowledge and their fight without designation by the name. 
In 1960s, platforms for “dirty” money in offshore tax havens and
financial centers −base for the geographic expansion of Eurodollars, out of
range of their central banks− were established. In 1980s funds generated
by drug production increased. Narco-dollars between 1985 and 1995 paralleled
the financial deregulation processes, increasing ways of ensuring capital
growth, unrelated to the production of goods and services. 
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1. In theory, the main function of foreign exchange markets is to expedite payment for
international trade exchanges. 
2. Globalization opened the doors to financial crimes such as money laundering, insider
dealing, investment market fraud and financial market fraud. Reforms must be made, especially
in public awareness by providing and training of relevant information. All reform must deal with
the moral values concerned. See Freyer (1996c).
Chesnais (2000) points out that the volume of transactions related
to drug production and sales was estimated US$100 billion to $500 billion
a year during the first half of the 1990s3 and is difficult to identify the
flows of “dirty money” within this overall volume once they penetrate the
world financial system. 
Chesnais (2000) adds that one of the main characteristics of
financial globalization is that it has put the most prestigious centers −London,
Zurich, New York− in contact with offshore tax havens and financial
centers used by big banks and corporations for “gray-area” operations4,
and quotes the Geopolitical Drugs Observatory (GDO): “As the wide
social support enjoyed by cocaine production and sale in Colombia and
Bolivia shows, these are perfectly rational activities from the viewpoint of
certain social groups and several poor countries whose traditional export
markets have collapsed since the 1970s”.
I.1. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
FATF is an inter-governmental body which sets standards, and
develops and promotes policies to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing. It currently has 33 members: 31 countries and governments and
two international organizations; and more than 20 observers, five FATF-
style regional bodies and more than 15 other international organizations or
bodies. The FATF 40 Special Recommendations have been recognized by
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as the international
standards for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “The goal
of a large number of criminal acts is to generate a profit for the individual
or group that carries out the act. Money laundering is the processing of
these criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. This process is of
critical importance, as it enables the criminal to enjoy these profits
without jeopardizing their source. Illegal arm sales, smuggling, and the
149CASE STUDIES ON GLOBALISATION AND MONEY LAUNDERING
3. The total amount of foreign aid from the United States, other Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and the World Bank combined is about $50
billion per year. Yet, this $50 billion inflow to developing and transitional economies is completely
offset by the $100 billion which illegally flows back out of other pockets in those same countries
with U.S. and European assistance. 
4. The illegal activities of "dirty money" exploit every possibility offered for laundering and
investing capital in financial centers, as Bahrain, in British and Dutch Antilles, the Bahamas,
Bermuda, Cayman Islands and Hong Kong. IMF estimates 600-1500 billions US$ per year, in
Germany €30-€100 billions.
activities of organized crime, including for example drug trafficking and
prostitution rings, can generate huge sums. Embezzlement, insider trading,
bribery and computer fraud schemes can also produce large profits and
create the incentive to ´legitimize´ the ill-gotten gains through money
laundering”. It also points out that “when a criminal activity generates
substantial profits, the individual or group involved must find a way to
control the funds without attracting attention to the underlying activity or
the persons involved. Criminals do this by disguising the sources, changing
the form, or moving the funds to a place where they are less likely to
attract attention”.5
Before financial liberalization, tax havens represented the best
place to deposit the profits of drugs, etc., in banks outside the country of
origin. The FATF defines a “tax haven” as a country whose banking
system is not sufficiently regulated and which authorizes the installation
of “mailbox” companies. 
It has been noted that the liberalization of currency exchange,
growth in tourism and international transactions led to an increase in the
number of exchange houses and the amounts involved, facilitating the
laundering process, and that when dirty money has penetrated the financial
system it is easy to move it on a global scale. 
Fortunately, anti-money laundering campaigns are gaining
support from public opinion. Before financial globalization started,
money laundering appeared in the United States, as financial institutions
increased the possibility of penetrate the operations.6 Nowdays criminal
trade is most dynamic in citadels of financial globalization, like London;
and financial deregulation allowed non-banking financial institutions with
lower professional ethics to increase relocation of money with fewer
controls. Additionally, banking secrecy in countries such as Switzerland
increases related risks.7 More recently, since the tragic events of
September 11, also terrorism is associated with money laundering.
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5. FATF web page, “Money Laundering FAQ”.Available: http://www.fatf- gafi.org/
document/29/0,3343,en_32250379_32235720_33659613_1_1_1_1,00.html 
6. For instance the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which built its
fortune on fraud and narco-dollar laundering, as well as other US banks, including First Bank of
Boston, Chase Manhattan, Irving Trust, Bank of America, where employees directly involved
were sentenced and banks fined, probably not enough to deter laundered money. 
7. Due to space limitations we cannot concentrate here on an analysis of models on money
laundering, e.g. phase model of Bernasconi, 3-Phase-model, etc.
Financing terrorism changed the way the law perceives money laundering
fostering the emergence of global measures aimed at countering this
criminal practice. 
II. THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
Ethical questions are gaining space with globalization at weight,
demanding a new value system and better control structures.8
Globalization began in 19th century, stimulated by technological
advances, liberal trade, remarkably free movement of people, and almost
entirely free movement of capital. The world also enjoyed an unprecedented
rise in prosperity: economic history shows that worldwide real GDP per
head rose at a rate of 1.3 percent a year between 1870 and 1913, until two
World Wars ruined the first wave of globalization. Breaking with the
system of regulated financial operations and control over capital movements,
existing since the crisis of 1929, the current financial globalization is
dominating the majority of national systems. 
Our second era of globalization involves accentuated financing
aimed at greater profit from available capital, with capital gains increasingly
important9. But globalization has also generated concern over increased
inequality and environmental degradation. Globalization of financial
markets and money laundering is a problem with new dimensions. Since
transparency of financial transactions on global markets is considered
insufficient, the EU and the OECD formulated in 2002 a set of proposals
to fight money laundering. They include higher transparency of the capital
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8. Ethical violations in finance relate to insider trading, stakeholder interest versus stockholder inte-
rest, investment management, and campaign financing. Business in general, and financial mar-
kets in particular are replete with examples of violations of trust and loyalty in public and
private dealings.  See Ratzinger (2005). 
9. On Nov. 14, 2001, the German Federal Cabinet passed the draft of the 4th Financial
Market Promotion Act tabled by the Federal Finance Minister. “It aims to improve investor protection
by increasing market integrity and market transparency, expanding the scope and flexibility of
market participants, as well as closing gaps in the system of defense against money laundering
and facilitating the discovery of monies which serve to finance terrorist organizations… amend-
ment will allow the exchanges more flexibility in organizing exchange trading and enable them to
react more flexibly to market changes. In securities trading law, investor protection will be
increased through the improvement of market integrity, e.g. through the revision of the ban on price
and market manipulation and the transfer of responsibility for monitoring this to the federal authori-
ties”. Deutsche Börse Groupweb page. 
Available: http://deutscheboerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/listcontent/gdb_navigation/
listing/60_Newsboard/60_Top_Story/Content_Files/lc_art_ts_bundeskabinett_bes-
chliesst_4_finanzmarktfoerderungsgesetz.htm
movements, the limitation of privileges by certain occupation groups (trus-
tee, notaries etc.), and the possibilities of registration expanded. Also,
sanctions against not cooperating countries and territories are suggested,
since offshore centers are weaknesses of the financial system. Further,
judicial and administrative collaboration must be strengthened as well as
bank supervision with a limitation of cash and the regulation of activities
by clearing-houses. With growing electronic money (cybermoney) and the
development of derivatives, current methods of supervision are insufficient
and need to be adapted to the new challenges. 
To fight against money laundering banks and other financial services
providers prefer voluntarily cooperation instead of issuing “black lists” of
financial institutions. Cooperation of financial institutions with supervision
authorities is also important.
III. CASE STUDIES ON CAPITAL LAUNDERING
III.1. Russian Money Laundering
Russia suffered an impoverishment by the greatest illicit diversion
of resources that has ever occurred out of any country in a short period of
time; US$150 to US$200 billions in a decade by very conservative
estimates, with figures as high as US$500 billion being also offered.10
The combination of criminal money laundering and illegal flight capital
aided by western banking institutions brought this result to Yeltsin’s
Russia. By the end of 1991, Gorbachev’s Perestroika shops were nearly
empty, producers had begun hoarding, as had fearful consumers. Yeltsin
announced in November 1991 that the government intended to free prices.
Predictably, producers withheld their products from markets and rubbed
their hands. Central Bank Chairman Gerashchenko protested and the IMF
continued lending. 
A transparent privatization delivering property widely to Russia’s
hands should have preceded the freeing of prices. Producers should have
enjoyed some protectionism, as did manufacture in the 19th century.11 On
the contrary, privatization of property in a country without property rights
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10. Anne Williamson, WorldNetDaily.com, Sep. 1, 1999. 
Available: http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a392764880929.htm
11. IMF made multiple mistakes handling the Russian crisis on 1998 (Stiglitz, 2006). 
resulted in an expensive, exhausting and destructive program of paper title
transfers. Yeltsin oversaw that the property titles were transferred to key
citizens, institutions and long-term cronies, so they would have a vested
interest in sustaining him in power. On January 2, 1992, Yeltsin freed
prices; the country suffered a 2500 percent inflation rate in that year.
The implications were costly: in 1994, the Russian Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD) estimated that 25% of the Russian gross national income
was derived from organized criminal activities. The MVD also believed
that 5600 criminal groups were involved primarily in capital/money
laundering, the drug business, and extortion. Under this dismal scenario,
on June 14, Yeltsin issued a Decree “On the urgent measures to defend the
population against gangsterism and other kinds of organized crime”, it
was controversial but supported by the majority of the Russian people to
fight organized crime. Experts believed laws would help control the eco-
nomic criminalization caused by organized criminal associations and
would encourage the development of honest business. 
Russian reforms failed as the result of a combination of three policies:
a forced inflation, tariff reductions and voucher privatization. Russia needed
direct investments, not speculative debt traders. 
In 2000 the FATF blacklisted 15 countries including Liechtenstein,
Israel, etc., and also Russia, for not cooperating on money laundering. Later,
Russia launched a clampdown on illegal international transfers of dirty
money by pushing new legislation quickly and implementing it. In May
2001, the Duma ratified the broad international convention on money
laundering, soon signed into law by President Vladimir Putin. In 2002
Russia was taken off the list of countries failing to co-operate in the
international fight against money laundering. 
III.2. Ukraine
Due to their weak anti-money laundering regimes, Grenada and
Ukraine were added to the FATF list of non-cooperative countries and
territories in 2002. Ukraine has been criticized for having deficiencies in
its customer identification provisions and for providing inadequate resources
to combat money laundering. 
Money laundering in Ukraine during the country process to become a
market economy increased the probability of legalizing illegal incomes.
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This was the result of the imperfectness of laws regulating the activity of
economic structures, inexperience of law enforcement bodies dealing with
this problem, penetration of shady moneymakers and criminal environment
into its economy.12 Money laundering took place via export and import
operations, cash Pooling-Accounts and compensation business, etc..
Ilegally acquired funds are remitted to accounts of dummy firms, and then
foreign currency is transferred abroad to pay import contracts. Then,
money is transferred from one account to another until it becomes legal. 
Among other well-known ways of illegal enrichment are embezzle
credits (especially state ones), deceive partners, attract public funds, cause
bank failures, privatize industry and trade, etc. Other practices are: (i)
Make banks grow rapidly through capital accumulation, and then going
bankrupt, when in reality they transferred money to foreign bank accounts
and these funds were put into legal business abroad or in Ukraine. Because
of imperfections in the mechanism to easy the interaction between
Ukraine’s National Bank and commercial banks, managers disappeared
and documents were missing. (ii) Encasing foreign exchange by Ukrainian
business persons through the purchase or establishment of firms abroad,
the opening of representative offices or branches in Ukraine, and then
transferring large sums of foreign exchange through foreign contracts. (iii)
Cash money is given to foreigners to pay traveling or other expenses
because they can get cash exchange on legal grounds. (iv) Very large
amounts of money are put into a shady circulation through external economic
activities of enterprises (price and import volume manipulations, illegal
customs registration). In such cases, customs duty discharge is considerably
reduced and goods illegally imported. 
The combination of efforts of all governmental bodies and financial
institutions can prevent money laundering in Ukraine. Ukraine’s law “On
preventing and struggling against the legalization of illegal incomes” and
the creation of the National Agency on Financial Security will favor solving
the problem of money laundering. Laundering dirty money is realized
through financial institutions as bank employees which know about illegal
operations, and sometimes even participating of them. State organizations
are impeded of taking control of all suspicious transactions because of the
large number of commercial banks in Ukraine.
154 ECKHARD FREYER
12. See Golubev and Saytarly (2003). “Typical schemes of outflow of capital and money
laundering in Ukraine”. Computer Crime Research Center. 
Available:  http://www.crime-research.org/library/Saytarly_ML.html
III.3. Germany
The privatization of East German enterprises
In 1989-90, German unification formed a caesura in German and
European history. The Treuhand agency privatized East German enterpri-
ses owned as public property. Created by the Volkskammer on June 17,
1990, it oversaw the restructuring and selling of about 8,500 firms with
initially over 4 million employees. At that time it was the world’s largest
industrial enterprise. Critics about the unnecessary closing off of profitable
businesses, misuse and waste of funds and unnecessary layoffs soon arose.
In this context, money laundering emerged out of the proceeds of an illegal
embargo business and part of the disappeared GDR-assets, e.g. the GDR
firm empire KoKo.13
As an example we have the Leuna-Minol case, one of the most
spectacular examples of the German post-war history, of which politicians
and the corruptibility politics altogether was reproached. The scandal
released an avalanche of proposals, initiatives and new laws and/or
changes in the law to the subject of corruption. The French oil group Elf
got the Leuna-works to an advantage price. Later German money laundering
fight laws were concluded in 2002 after 9-11.
III.3.2 German tax evaders and Money laundering 
A secret dossier of the Bundes Nachrichten Diensts14 (BND)
called Liechtenstein a “Hort der internationalen Geldwäsche” (repository
of international money laundering). Based on its law (anonymous founda-
tions, number accounts, banking secrecy, tax rates) Liechtenstein (and
Switzerland) want to participate in the global growing offshore-business
(Bernasconi, 1999). The requirement that financial internet transactions
must be anonymous and safe, and the need for disclosures concerning
alleged widespread tax evasion by German citizens through Liechtenstein,
highlights a much broader challenge to successfully deal with tax evasion
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13. Also the transmission of the relatively generous West German social system and its
institutions connected powerful transfer achievements and conditions in politics and economy.
The crisis of the German welfare state until today has no answer on globalization, the indebted-
ness of the country and the demographic change, see Roland Eisen (2007).
14. In January 24, 2006, the BND (Federal Information Service) received an email through its
regular Internet address. The sender claimed to have secret data from Liechtenstein that he was
prepared to offer the BND. The material, he wrote, was related to financial investments
worth €3.5 billion ($5.2 billion). He added that he was not reporting the information in
return for payment, but because it struck him as deeply unfair that multimillionaires could
continue to amass their fortunes without paying taxes. Focus Online (28/07/2005). Available:
http://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/geldwaesche/das-bnd-dossier_aid_15744.html
by German citizens: how to respond to countries/territories that seek to
profit from tax dodging by residents of other jurisdictions.
In our increasingly interdependent world, OECD countries and a
number of co-operative financial centres have been working together for a
number of years to address the problems posed by anti-competitive tax
practices, both in OECD countries and offshore, by developing standards
of transparency and exchange of information in tax matters that balance
the interests of financial privacy with the need for countries to effectively
enforce their own tax laws. In 2002, OECD published a list of un-coopera-
tive tax havens, initially including seven countries. Several have now
made commitments to work with OECD to improve transparency; remaining
Andorra, Monaco and Liechtenstein. “As long as these financial centres
refuse to co-operate in bilateral tax information exchange and fail to meet
international transparency standards, residents in other countries will
continue to be tempted to continue to evade their tax obligations”.15
An economic scandal in Germany involved as many as 900
wealthy Germans and almost up to 4 billion euros in taxes. At stake are
billions of euros in tax revenues lost to the German government. A total of
up to 20 bank employees, members of foundation boards and account
managers in Liechtenstein and Germany are under investigation for their
alleged roles in developing tax savings models. The debate on welfare
reforms and excessively high executive compensations has drawn the
attention to the ever-widening gap between rich and poor.16,17 On
February 27, 2008, belatedly transferring EU-guidelines, the German
Federal government decided on stricter rules against money laundering.18 
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15. OECD web page (19/02/2008),  “Tax disclosures in Germany part of a broader cha-
llenge, says OECD Secretary-General”,Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3343,en_2649_201185_40114018_1_1_1_1,00.html 
16. While life at the bottom of society is characterized by inadequacy and uncertainty, those
at the top are accused of living in excess and eroding the cherished German principle of social
solidarity. Spiegel Online,(02/25/2008), “Liechtenstein's Shadowy Informant: Tax Whistleblower
Sold Data to the US”. Available: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,537640-4,00.html 
17. Annually hundred of billions US$ disappear out of the balances of payments in high tax
countries, and circulate in the global financial system. The Caymans are the fifth largest finance
place of the world: six hundred commercial banks are registered, without physical presence;
forty-seven of the leading large banks are registered in the country, twenty of the largest
American banks. An investigation commission of the US-senate concludes that leading American
banks, Chase Manhattan, Citigroup, etc. are insufficient against offshore money laundering.
18. See Reuters (27/2/ 2008), “Deutschland  Kabinett beschließt Gesetz zur wirksameren
Geldwäsche-Bekämpfung Mittwoch”.Available:
http://de.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idDEBUC74446120080227.
IV. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
A free movement of capital and payments within the EU, and
between the EU and third countries, is an essential component for
establishing the internal market in financial services. A complex EU
framework for combating money laundering must not be overseen
especially in new member states.19 On January 1, 2007, the EU was
enlarged through the accession of two new Member States, namely
Bulgaria and Romania. The European Central Bank and the European
Commission will prepare convergence reports every two years. These
reports provide the basis for the EU Council’s decision on whether the
new Member States fulfill the necessary conditions for the adoption of the
euro. On 1 January, 2008, the euro was introduced in Cyprus and Malta
(Freyer, 1998c; Jovanovic, 2005). Six years after the introduction of the
euro banknotes and coins in the 12 “first-wave” countries and one year
after the adoption of the euro by Slovenia, this is the third successful euro
cash changeover.20
IV.1 Single European Payments Area-SEPA
To Facilitate the full potential of the European economy via the
Single European Payments Area (SEPA) calls for the continuous impro-
vement of payment services, by offering pan-European products that are
as easy, efficient and safe as they are today at the national level. The
European Payments Council (EPC) is focusing on the development of
three pan-European payment instruments: SEPA credit transfers, direct
debits and card payments. These three payment instruments will dominate
cashless payments in virtually all EU countries. The SEPA is an initiative
of the European banking industry.
By anticipating modern payment systems and a continuous
improvement of service levels, the SEPA is enabling the realization of
new technological opportunities and can provide major benefits.21 In an
important departure from the previous system in use, the SEPA makes no
distinction between national and cross-border payments. Under SEPA,
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19. See Franco (1996), Eckhard (1998c) and Eckhard (2004a).
20. See European Central Bank, Press Release,  (3/1/2008) ,  “The euro cash changeover in
Cyprus and Malta. Available: http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr080103.en.html.
21. See European Central Bank, Press Release  (4/5/2006), “Single Euro Payments Area Joint
statement from the European Commission and the European Central Bank”. Available:
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2006/html/pr060504_1.en.html
users of payment services will be able to make cashless payments in euro
from a single bank account using a single set of payment instruments
(SEPA credit transfers, SEPA direct debits and SEPA card payments) as
easily, smoothly and safely as they can with national payment instruments
today. Commencing January 1, 2008, the SEPA affects each and every
credit institution, commercial enterprise and consumer, first in the 13
euro-area countries. Other European nations which are not part of the
€-area are free to participate by making use of the relevant rules, procedures
and standards. Each working day, 187 million cashless payment transactions
are initiated in the euro area, over 85% of which are credit transfers, direct
debits and card payments. 
Payment fraud is an important threat to the European economy,
and in particular for the health of an efficient Single Payment Area in
Europe. It also undermines user’s confidence in payment systems, in
particular in relation to new payment technologies. Prevention of (and
combating) payment fraud needs to be improved. This can be achieved
through the active cooperation of all the stakeholders involved in the
payment chain. Indeed, the effectiveness of the prevention measures is
enhanced when they are designed and implemented in partnership with all
the parties concerned.22 Preventive measures against fraud in non-cash
means of payment is of great importance for the creation of an EU Single
Payment Area with efficient and secure payment means and systems, and
confidence of users in the payment systems. At the European level, further
improvements in efficiency in the area of payment settlement have allowed
economies of scale which will benefit the European economy as a whole.
The harmonization of payment instruments presents banks with a strategic
challenge. This takes the form of offering new products and services,
developing new business models and replacing antiquated systems as well
as optimizing settlement options. SEPA lays the foundations for increased
competition. SEPA project makes a major contribution to the Lisbon agenda
which inter alia aims to boost the dynamism of the European economy. 23
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22. The EU launched in October 2004 a new Action Plan (2004-2007) to prevent fraud on
non-cash means of payment Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/fraud/index_en.htm Summary minutes of the 13th
meeting of the comitee on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing held in
Brussels (11/12/2007). Available: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/financial-
crime/meetings/20071211-summary_en.pdf 
23. Transparent accounts to trace dirty money or funds connected with terrorist financing
may undermine data protection and the citizens’ trust in their governments respect for
their privacy. See Bremen Research Center on Money Laundering (available:
http://www.bfog.uni-bremen.de/cms_en/) and European Parliament legislative resolution on the
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, including terrorist financing
(COM(2004)0448-C6-0143/2004- 2004/0137(COD).
A broader definition of fraud in non-cash means of payment24 can
help for a better understanding of the growing involvement of trans-national
organised crime in payment fraud and how in most cases is able to circumvent
countermeasures. Estimates in relation to card fraud in the EU are between
€500 and €1000 millions, and more worryingly, payment fraud is increasingly
taking a trans-national nature. At the beginning of the 21st century organized
crime became a topic in public debate and on political agendas throughout
Europe. To control organized crime, far-reaching legal and institutional
reforms have been implemented.
IV.2 Financial Transparency and Money Laundering
The aim of the EU is to reduce the risk of financial malpractice
covering also taxation and law enforcement. Four lines against corporate
malpractice are considered: (i) internal control in a company, (ii) independent
third parties, (iii) supervision and (iv) enforcement.25
Based on these challenges the European Commission launched
strategies to prevent financial and corporate malpractice.26 The “Parmalat
affair showed how some companies use complex structures to reduce the
transparency of their activities to investor” (Frits Bolkestein, Internal
Market Commissioner). Risks of such financial scandals must be reduced,
with policies needing to be tightened up in certain areas since these
scandals damage financial markets and confidence declines. Artificially
Raised Values27 as fraud schemes are an explanation for offering inflated
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24. Transparent accounts to trace dirty money or funds connected with terrorist financing
may undermine data protection and the citizens’ trust in their governments respect for their
privacy. See Bremen Research Center on Money Laundering (available:
http://www.bfog.uni-bremen.de/cms_en/) and European Parliament legislative resolution on the
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, including terrorist financing
(COM(2004)0448-C6-0143/2004- 2004/0137(COD). 
25. See Summaries of EU legislation, Corporate and financial malpractice (2004). Available:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime
/l33224_en.htm
26. The European Commission has adopted a strategy for co-ordinated action in the financial
services, company law, accounting, tax, supervision and enforcement areas, to reduce the risk of
financial malpractice. The Commission’s Communication recommends timely and effective
implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan (Action Plan for Company Law and
Corporate Governance), an effective EU framework for dealing with most of the financial issues
raised by the recent scandals, as well as strict control of the application of legislation. The
Commission suggests new policy initiatives in tax and law enforcement. The key elements are:
enhanced transparency, improved traceability and better co-ordinated enforcement. 
27. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has opened criminal inquiries into 14 companies as
part of an investigation of the subprime-mortgage crisis. FBI officials said the probe is focusing
on accounting fraud, securitization of loans and insider trading, among other areas.
values in exchange for fees of millions US dollars. Still, fraud remains a
problem for companies around the world: e.g. the € 5 billion loses announced
by Société Générale.28
Also, as no oversight of hedge funds exists and more frauds can
come, government must take a greater role to control banks and funds
better. “In fact, the current subprime crisis is a typical product of the financial
globalization and liberalization championed by the United States (US).
Globalization and liberalization of economic activities should take place
on a level playing field. But the globalization and liberalization of finance
led by the US is based on power politics. Other countries, including Japan,
have no choice but accept the “open market theory” as wielded by the US,
“the financial cowboy” of the world. The US format emphasizes market
opening and liberalization of financial products and trading without a
“common system” based on equality, fairness and negotiations to keep
things in order. From accounting rules, market assessment systems, risk
control procedures, to financial policies and even market terminology,
everything is decided by the US. In order to guarantee US capital a smooth
ride anywhere in the world, the federal authorities have ignored conventional
practices in market evaluation and “played dirty” to whitewash the real
risks of such low-credit products as subprime mortgages. In the financial
market painting over real risks inevitably leads to investment bubbles.
Once it becomes a crisis, even sound assets could go down the drain. Such
is the seriousness of the current subprime crisis. The Fed seems to have
been fooled by watered-down market assessments. The subprime crisis
may end up bringing the US out of its wild fantasy and back into the real
world, where it has to pursue “financial globalization” with other nations
fairly, openly, and on a level playing field”.29 With Globalization of economic
activities/markets (services, capital and information as well as labour) inter-
dependence is quickly increasing, especially cross-border mobility.
V. MONEY LAUNDERING AND MORAL30
The aim of law is to control limit the burden that drugs, crimina-
lity and corruption put on society. Then, fiscal measures, the widespread of
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28. Clear segregation of back- and front-office activities was one of the clearest lessons
to emerge from the rogue-trading scandal at Barings Bank in 1995. See  Economist.com
(Jan 29th 2008), "Société Générale and the rogue trader”. Available: 
http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10598231&top_story=1 
29. Researcher -China Institute of International Relations: China Daily (01/29/2008) [online].
Available: www.chinadaily.com.cn. 
30. Cfr. Dobson (1993) and Bhagwati (2004).
democracy, social control of corporate behaviour, etc. gains importance.
Economic globalization continues to outpace both the political structures
and the moral sensitivity required to ensure a just and sustainable world.
To achieve these aims requires that all nations commit themselves to reali-
ze that goal (Stiglitz, 2006).31 A broader definition on ethical purposes and
responsibility and sustainable investments can help to overcome existing
limits, e.g. the project “Ethical-Ecological Rating” based on ecological and
social criteria (Boatright, 2007).32 Other creative projects, e.g. Grameen
Bank, have also proved having positive effects in this context.33
The actual discussion in Germany on money laundering and moral
leadership should remember policy makers the establishment of the
Deutsche Bank Foundation: can charities be grounded in the best of
values? To expect moral leadership from the nonprofit and philanthropic
sector, particularly in times when other public and private institutions fail,
etc..34 Can charities become money-launderers, accepting stolen goods?35
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31. “Bankers/rating agencies believed in financial alchemy. They thought that financial
innovations could somehow turn bad mortgages into good securities, meriting AAA ratings. A
lesson of modern finance theory is that repackaging risks not make much difference. There might
be some money in repackaging, but not the billions that banks made by slicing and dicing
sub-prime mortgages into packages whose value was much greater than their contents. The only
thing we got wrong was how bad banks’ lending practices were, how non-transparent banks
really were, and how inadequate their risk management systems were. It was interesting to see
the different cultural attitudes to the crisis on display. In Japan, the CEO of a major bank would
have apologized to his employees and his country, and would have refused his pension and bonus
so that those who suffered as a result of corporate failures could share the money. He would have
resigned. In America, the only questions are whether a board will force a CEO to leave and how
big his severance package will be. This is the third US crisis in the past 20 years, after the Savings
& Loan crisis of 1989 and the Enron/WorldCom crisis in 2002. Deregulation has not worked.
Markets may do not lead, as if by an invisible hand, to societal well-being. Achieving a better
balance between markets and government is essential”. Joseph E. Stiglitz, (2008), “Alpine
Schadenfreude”, Project Syndicate. Available: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sti-
glitz96/English
32. See also Dow Jones Sustainability Index (Available: http://www.sustainability-index.com),
Sustainability Yearbook 2008.
33. M. Yunus pioneered microcredit, the innovative banking program that provides poor
people with small loans they use to launch businesses and lift their families out of poverty. In the
past thirty years, microcredit has spread to every continent and benefited over 100 million
families. See Yunus and Weber (2007); Dowla and Barua (2006). 
34. See Ekir Landessynode (2008) "Vorlage der Kirchenleitung an die Landessynode
Wirtschaften für das Leben. Stellungnahme zur Wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung und ihren
Herausforderungen für die Kirchen. Available: 
www.enodo.de/downloads/DarmstaedterErklaerung.pdf  
35. Stanford Social Innovation Review, (January 31, 2006), Mark Rosenman,   Blog : Money
Laundering & Moral Leadership. Available:
http://www.ssireview.org/site/printer/money_laundering_moral_leadership
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Links:
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) des BKA zur Bekämpfung von
Geldwäsche. Available:
http://www.bka.de/profil/zentralstellen/geldwaesche/index.html
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. Available:
www.fatf-gafi.org/
International Money Laundry Information Network. Available:
www.imolin.org/
The European Banking Federation. Available:
http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. Available:
www.bafin.de/
Eidgenössische Bankenkommission. Available:
http://www.finma.ch/archiv/ebk/d/index.html
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Available:
www.unodc.org/
WikiLeaks - a forum for the citizens of the world to disclose issues of
social, moral and ethical concern. Available:
http://wikileaks.org/
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